There’s an “easy” way to fast-track popular proposals past the CAP and delegation hurdle. If we have a community member with 100k voting power already delegated (currently there are 8 such voters) we can try to convince them to submit the proposal as they already meet the delegation threshold for full proposal. The discussion to lower the delegation threshold proposal both increases the number of community members with enough power to immediately submit full proposals, and lowers the delegation hurdle for Autonomous Proposals. This has been discussed before and we will probably see a proposal or CAP coming to lower the threshold 
in the future.
In the case of adding LINK, we’ve already reached over 65k delegation so we’re gaining momentum toward the 100k needed for the CAP. It will be interesting to see how gathering delegations goes, 35k is still a large amount of COMP to get re-delegated!
Agreed! I know @blck has indicated willingness to delegate (but is currently tied up in another live proposal).
Any other takers?
If nothing changes i will do it at the end of sunday, so the review and the voting period will be on normal working days and not weekend.
Well the CAP for adding LINK lost its 65k delegation. Maybe would you consider proposing the LINK token-add this coming Sunday evening @blck ? @TylerEther received a grant for this so you two could probably coordinate offline for any compensation of gas fees or other work items, or even directly with grants committee if you want separate payments.
There’s another proposal inbound here Safety and Gas Patches but it appears they’re not done with the code reviews and changes yet. If that proposal does come out before this one then I guess we can use the new cToken implementation (part of each liquidation goes to cToken reserves).
TUSD proposal is now live so we’ll have to wait until after that one. https://compound.finance/governance/proposals/45
Awesome, I didn’t even know we could have two proposals pending at the same time! @TylerEther you can get that COMP back from the cap for voting on this proposal by using the terminate() option on the cap. Thanks so much for posting the proposal @blck ! 
you can have more it just a limit / proposer
@tonyotonio delegations to the CAP will no longer be votable for adding LINK because we were able to get a full proposal posted by blck (community member with 100k delegation). Please update this post to remove the cap address and request users to re-delegate to their preferred voting address (self or community member).
We are currently in the two-day review period so there is still time to re-delegate!
Update: some benevolent user has queued the proposal in the timelock, thank you for that! 
Now that the proposal has passed the vote (success), it can be queued in the Timelock. There will be a 48 hour delay between when it is queued and when it can be executed. Any address can queue the proposal.
-
GovernorBravoDelegator | 0xc0da02939e1441f497fd74f78ce7decb17b66529
- Write as Proxy Function “
queue”- Proposal ID:
46
- Proposal ID:
- Write as Proxy Function “
- Update: Proposal has been queued!
Excellent! Thanks for the update.
Happy to see all the recent progress here in the Compound community, I feel like we are in a groove. Congrats again to @TylerEther on getting this proposal passed!
Congratulations everyone! 
What a great community! Thanks everyone!!
Is this TRiLeZ from Tribot?
I’ve been spotted 
Good to see talent in the crypto space!
LINK:
- Traded at a large number of exchanges: Binance, Okex, Coinbase, FTX, Houbi. Between them and legitimate others, the 24hr volume looks to be +$400m
- DEX liquidity: Uniswap v3 ~$83m volume 7-day, Uniswap v2 $30m liquidity, Suhsiswap $63m liquidity
- Notable: There are a few wallets with considerable LINK holdings. I think they are related to the team. I’ll try to find out.
- FDV: $24B
- Initial collateral factor: 50%
For reference: COMP
- Traded at a large number of exchanges: Binance/US, Okex, Coinbase, FTX. Between them and legitimate others, the 24hr volume looks to be around $210m
- DEX liquidity: Uniswap v3 ~$17m volume 7-day, Uniswap v2 $3m liquidity, Suhsiswap $14m liquidity, Balancer v2 $7m
- Notable: The treasury holds 31.5% of minted COMP.
- FDV: $4.5B
- Collateral factor: 60%
Something very important to consider about link is the concentrated holdings. 45% of link is held in unverified contracts (I think by link team). This is $10+ B which would essentially allow the link team to take all of Compound held funds. I think limiting the amount of collateral Link in the protocol would be a good idea.
I am not concerned but I appreciate you bringing up the point. It would be great if we had supply caps.
A related scenario to consider is if a hacker gained control of the Chainlink project wallets containing this $10B worth of LINK. Today that hacker might be able to liquidate $100M via DEXes. But Compound offers a much wider exit ramp: by depositing the $10B LINK you could “borrow” $5B of liquid assets.
So allowing unlimited collateral means the Compound protocol inherits the security quality of the Chainlink treasury. About all you can say about that is “seems good so far”. But, by creating the exit route for funds, we would increase the incentive to hack their wallets by 50x or more.
At a minimum for our due diligence, we should know how many individual people would need to be compromised to allow this to occur.
Here are a few ideas for mitigating the risk of a collateral exploit (this applies to any vulnerable collateral, not just LINK, especially those with centralized minting such as WBTC):
- supply cap - this is a sure way to limit the damage of a collateral exploit, but has the big disadvantage of putting a hard limit on the size of the protocol.
- supply inflow rate limit - for example, constrain the daily inflow of new collateral assets to some dollar value, possibly with a governance multisig override. This defends against the “hacker trying to quickly liquidate stolen assets” attack, while allowing unlimited gradual growth of the total value of protocol assets.
- segregated markets - for example, create a separate set of pools where riskier assets could be supplied as collateral, and where stablecoin lenders would most likely be rewarded with higher interest rates to reflect the higher risk. Some downsides: fractured liquidity and complexity for users.