I abstained from voting on Proposal 32, and voted FOR Proposal 59. This proposal isn’t perfect, but I believe that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages.
While there are strong arguments on both sides of the debate as to whether the November DAI price spike warrants compensation, it is the only event in Compound history that comes close to a “reserve worthy event”, and @kybx86 / @arr00 have done a remarkable job in the technical implementation of a solution (following the work by @getty and Chainlink to add preventative measures against the root cause).
This proposal demonstrates how reserves can be utilized by the community to protect users of the protocol, and I firmly believe that its passage sends a message to current and prospective users that the community is capable and willing to tackle adverse events (rare as they should be).
@monet-supply, @pyggie and others have pointed out that the allocation of reserves is inefficient; that it rewards farmers, and that the community should pro-actively select which users deserve compensation; I completely agree, but don’t think we should seek to punish (or not-compensate) users retroactively for activity we wish wasn’t occurring–instead, we should use this as a catalyst to calibrate COMP distribution and incentives going-forward, to disincentivize farming or non-useful activity.