COMP Buyback
The COMP buyback program positions the protocol’s absorption mechanism as a standing limit order, purchasing COMP using blue-chip reserve assets such as USDC and WETH. However, this approach introduces a critical trade-off:
- Without a strict supply cap, COMP holders could game the system by dumping tokens. For example, by creating risky COMP-collateralized positions and deliberately triggering liquidations, the protocol is forced to absorb COMP collateral and inherit debt.
- With a strict supply cap, the program’s ability to generate meaningful buy pressure is limited. In addition, Compound’s existing $78 million COMP treasury leaves little room for significant additional accumulation. This raises concerns about the risk-reward tradeoff, as the potential downside of absorbing volatile COMP collateral may outweigh the marginal benefits of increasing treasury holdings.
These risks are further amplified by the role of COMP as endogenous collateral, where the collateral value is directly linked to the protocol’s success. This relationship creates a dangerous feedback loop:
COMP price declines can trigger sell-offs → collateral devaluation → widespread absorption → the protocol accumulates more devalued assets and increases its exposure to potential bad debts → community confidence erodes, further accelerating the price declines
Beyond this feedback loop, the protocol’s ability to recover from insolvency shrinks just when it is needed most. While Compound markets are less dependent on endogenous collateral, making the LUNA and Thorchain Lending style collapse unlikely to happen, the buyback program could still cause significant damage in times of market stress.
BUILD COMP Liquidity
The community already recognizes a lack of DEX liquidity for COMP on Layer 2s, with meaningful liquidity available primarily on the Ethereum mainnet. Liquidating large COMP-collateralized positions is already challenging even on the mainnet. To demonstrate, consider the liquidation process for the largest COMP-collateralized position:
- According to Gauntlet’s risk dashboard, the largest COMP-collateralized position on Compound is 0xd74f186194ab9219fafac5c2fe4b3270169666db with $6.7M USDC borrow against $22M COMP collateral
- Suppose the COMP’s price drops sharply, reducing the collateral value to $9.5M, the position becomes liquidatable and is absorbed by the protocol:
-
Upon absorption, the protocol inherits $9.5M of COMP and $7.125M of USDC debt
-
Liquidators can purchase the collateral at a 15% discount from the protocol (calculated as store front price factor * liquidation penalty = 60% * 25%)
-
However, selling only $520k worth of COMP incurs 16.9% slippage, so it’s almost impossible to liquidate the full $9.5M COMP position using on-chain liquidity
-
In addition, according to Gauntlet’s COMP mainnet liquidity slippage curve, there’s still significant slippage for small size.
Given this dynamic, the protocol faces a structural challenge: it is forced to absorb large COMP positions due to insufficient DEX liquidity. Liquidators may have to rely on off-chain CEX liquidity (such as TWAP orders or splitting orders), both of which carry higher execution risks. While it remains unclear whether the proposed code changes for the COMP Buyback program would result in a different outcome, we strongly support initiatives aimed at building COMP liquidity.
Re: “Compound Treasury borrows against it to deposit into the COMP - DOLA LP”
This strategy is similar to the Protocol-Owned Liquidity (POL) model pioneered by Olympus DAO. Experimenting with it could provide clear utility and insights to the community. We recommend starting small (e.g., no more than 5% of the treasury) and re-evaluating the outcome. In addition, we also have several questions about the implementation details:
- Will this strategy be managed via a multisig, a custom-built solution, or by leveraging existing protocols (e.g., Aera)?
- Aera has built two POL Vaults (1, 2) for Morpho and one for Euler
- How can we effectively solve the coordination problem?
- What measures are in place to ensure accountability for the execution?
DeFi Partnerships
Re: “Deploy DOLA market to Optimism or Base or Both”
To maximize the impact of market expansion, we recommend prioritizing stablecoin markets with higher revenue potential. This focus could drive more borrowing / lending activities and revenue opportunities unless Inverse Finance commits to providing significant incentives.
- Optimism:
- sUSD: $32.4M
- DAI: $18.5M
- DOLA: $5.4M
- Base:
- USDS: $100.6M
- DOLA: $33.9M