Proposal to Revoke COMP Delegation from Yield Strategy

About Proposal

This post proposes revoking the COMP voting delegation currently assigned to the Compound Foundation from the Avantgarde Yield Strategy. The Yield Strategy’s COMP should not be used to amplify the voting power of any party that may seek treasury funding.

Current State

  • The Avantgarde Yield Strategy holds DAO-owned COMP as part of its treasury return mandate.
  • Some or all of that COMP is currently delegated to the Compound Foundation for governance voting.

Why This Needs to Change

The Yield Strategy exists to generate returns for the DAO not to serve as a governance power source for any operating entity.

At the time the delegation was set, it was meant to be a short-term, temporary measure. That rationale no longer holds. Governance has advanced (delegate race cycle 2 has passed, participation has broadened, and new guardrails like ProposalGuardian are live), and the DAO will look to separate treasury strategy capital and governance influence.

Core Rationale

Conflict Avoidance (Circular Governance Risk)
The Compound Foundation is positioned to submit and/or support proposals that may request funds from the DAO treasury. Maintaining DAO-owned delegated voting power in this context creates an avoidable conflict dynamic:

Even if everyone acts in good faith, this structure is the exact pattern that explicitly defines “governance capture” this erodes trust and depresses long-term decentralization principles.

What This Does (and Does Not) Mean

  • This does not prevent the Foundation from participating in governance.
  • The Foundation can still receive delegation from independent tokenholders who purchased the token delegate to them.
  • This is strictly about not using DAO strategy-held COMP as a governance lever.

Implementation (Mechanical)

This is a delegation-only change, no strategy unwind required.

  • The controller of the Yield Strategy’s COMP executes the standard COMP governance delegation change.
  • The delegation is removed from the Compound Foundation.

Next Steps

  1. Discussion in this thread (72-96 hours): surface any objections or operational constraints.
  2. Confirm scope: Avantgarde/Foundation confirm current delegated amount and addresses for public record.
  3. Execute delegation change: publish the transaction details.
  4. proceed to an on-chain governance action to formalize the change.

Call for Community Feedback

Please Reply with:

  • Support / Don’t Support and a rationale
  • Any operational concerns

If there’s clear support here, we should move directly to execution.

1 Like

Our perspective is that the COMP in the Avatar Safe should remain actively delegated to the Foundation. The DAO executed this proposal via an onchain vote with no dissent back in December. Recalling this delegation after such a short period of time (just over 2 months) does not seem to reflect broader community consensus.

It’s also important to note the timeline of these events. Delegate Race Cycle 2 and the Proposal Guardian renewal were both finalized before the Yield Strategy delegation was approved. The Yield proposal was executed despite the other measures already being in place. We therefore believe the delegation should continue to operate as originally intended.

2 Likes

In light of new proposals made by The foundation, extracting value from DAO, the key issue is that the delegation intended for DAO protect measures, creates circular governance and will be now used for treasury funding. The use of voting power to approve proposals, such as draining funds from a protocol’s treasury, is the definition of a governance attack.

To reduce a back and forth I will try to ask this as plainly as possible:

Do you believe it is appropriate for the Foundation to use DAO-owned, strategy-mandated COMP (delegated to them) to vote on proposals that allocates additional treasury funding to the Foundation?

If the answer is “no” then a clean fix is obvious: revoke the delegation