Compound Proposal 68 recently succeeded in removing borrower rewards for the cCOMP market. This proposal was primarily meant to address governance risk and market inefficiencies - rewards were so high that the 100,000 COMP borrowing limit was continually being hit, preventing the market from reaching equilibrium.
While there are no borrowing caps in place on BAT, ZRX, UNI, and LINK markets, the effective borrowing rates for these assets have consistently been negative (currently ranging from -3.4% to -5.9%). This indicates that there is not a lot of natural demand for borrowing these assets.
Compound is currently providing ~9.5 COMP per day (~$2,700) to subsidize borrowers for each of these assets, while the total amount of reserves earned by the protocol per day for each asset ranges from $300-$500 per day. Basically Compound is paying $8,000+ per day to gain market share in non-existent markets.
I think it would make sense to remove borrowing incentives for each of these assets. This will save about 14,000 COMP per year which can be allocated for other uses (contributor funding, service contracts, incentivizing other markets, etc), and should also effectively end recursive leverage on these assets. Compound could still get most of the benefits of incentives by keeping the supplier incentives unchanged - supplier incentives offset the cost of borrowing ETH or stablecoins against these collateral assets, and support deep liquidity in case borrowing demand increases in the future.
What do you think? Please share your perspective and vote in the polls below! If there is broad support I’ll try to move this forward as a full proposal.
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