Oldest block prior to public announcement is obvious choice block 9555730 as @prestonvanloon references above and @allthecolors cites from a couple days ago. (Feb. 26th, 2020). Awesome work @allthecolors !
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I still donât really get why the date was set to public announcement of COMP. Could someone elaborate a bit more why that is such a good candidate?
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- Percentages based on social and capital provided? ( 90% social, 10% capital. With the cutoff for getting the capital distribution being addresses which earned greater than $100 interest. Just by eyeballing the list, those addresses represent about 10% of all accounts. )
â-My recommendation would be $50 in interest where those that may have not provided as much collateral but may have used the protocol longer and would be more inclined to continue supporting the protocol.
- Should we handle contract addresses differently than individual accounts? ( No, unless the capital distribution is diluted by not having a minimum amount of interest earned. )
âAgreed
- Any other metrics that need to be considered, based on this data? ( Probably a lot of different metrics could be considered, but I feel these 2 metrics are the most important, and therefore, all thatâs needed for Compoundâs early user distribution. )
â- Agreed that these two basic metrics provide the most universal way to apply for distribution.
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The proposed date of June 8th 2020 was quite widely publicised around the Ethereum community. It seems a shame to change it now. It would likely create a negative sentiment towards the Compound protocol amongst a number of early users, who are now going to miss out. I know many who have been following this thread closely for many months.
I am one of the users who would stand to benefit from a June 8th date, so I am of course somewhat biased. But I am also conscious of the 23.1k views on this thread, and how widely it was shared on Reddit, Discord, and other crypto communities. So it wouldnât just be me missing out! Many in the community checked their address against the previously posted distribution list. They would now be disappointed to be cut out.
I should also note, that in a informal poll in this very same thread, the original distribution list was widely supported: Should Compound Retroactively Airdrop Tokens to Early Users? - #232 by allthecolors
This also creates a âblack holeâ between February 2020 - June 2020 where no Comp was distributed to users during that period (before distribution begun, but apparently too late for an early user airdrop).This seems strange to omit this one time period. The logic only appears to be on the basis of the announcement of an upcoming COMP token on Feb 26th. But there was absolutely no indication of a retrospective airdrop being on the cards at that time.
So, why now change the date, when the originally suggested date appeared to be widely supported? There is not really any clear indication in this thread as to why the date was changed since that poll was conducted back in April. A date change was suggested by one user in the thread following the poll, and it is in fact the suggested change of date which appears to be the main point of contention for some posters here. Nobody seemed to have a major issue with the originally suggested date.
I totally support the work to include more accurate capital weights, and make sure anybody who used the contract is included. But it seems we have included those extra users, at the expense of others included in the previously proposed distribution list.
It is clear a lot of time and effort has gone into making this proposal work. Thanks @allthecolors for the great work. I am sure the governance process will come to a sensible decision on these matters, and get this proposal into motion. These are just my thoughts (as a biased person admittedly!)
-Sku
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Increased COMP distribution to large funded groups/individuals that already received and continue to receive a large portion of COMP through interest generated payments would not achieve/drive the overall goal of a decentralized governance but rather lead to increased centralized control.
Which legally and from a conflict of interest perspective may be detrimental to the future of the protocol as we saw with EtherDelta and Uniswap respectively.
I.E.
âParties with conflict of interest pushing through pro- posals (Uniswap-Dharma): A recent example of conflict of interest took place during Uniswapâs first proposal, made by Dharma, to reduce Uniswapâs existing governance thresholds. Dharma had 32% of the voting power at the time of the proposal while the second biggest voter had 30%. Dharmaâs made two proposals. One was for a reduction of the amount of tokens needed, in order to submit a proposal, from 1% to 0.3%. The second one was for a reduction in quorum, or the percentage of the total supply which must vote on a proposal in order to pass, from 4% to 3%. Dharma claimed that these two proposals would give the ability to smaller token holders to make proposals and also it would be easier for important proposals to not get rejected since many token holders do not bother voting. Dharma might have had the right intentions but looking at the numbers many could infer that these proposals could easily give more power to Dharma itself on governing Uniswapâs protocol. Uniswap total (not circulating) supply is 1 billion. Under the initial protocol rules, 10 million tokens would be needed in order to submit a proposal and 40 million tokens for the proposal to pass. Dharmaâs proposal was for a reduction of these two numbers to 3 million tokens and 30 million tokens, respectively.
Considering that Dharmaâs voting power is 15 million tokens or 32% [8] of the total voting power, while the second biggest voter has 30% of the votes or 14 million votes, by reducing the quorum threshold to 30 million, Dharma and the second biggest voter (Gauntlet) could combine voting power to push through any proposal these two believe would be best for Uniswap or them.â
On your proposal for comp distribution method to use:
âAll Compound protocol users will be eligible to participate in the community vote, weighted by usage of the protocol (measured by lifetime interest earned + interest paid) Third, users should be measured by usage of the protocol.
For an interest rate market, USAGEis a function of capital over time ; how other protocols have distributed tokens to users is irrelevant to Compound.
This approach was piloted during the second community vote , and formed the basis of the COMP Distribution when it began for users.
Luckily, in Compoundâs case, this can be easily measured by interest earned, and interest paid.â
This approach is specifically focused on financial contribution not necessarily a algorithm for âUSAGEâ. Wouldnât a better approach for defining usage be
(interest earned+interest paid)*50% + (interest earned/paid days)*50%
The number of days contributing to the protocol in my eyes is just as important as the financial contribution.
Given we are not assigning currency risk associated with the financial assets provided to the protocol.
Example those contributing stable coins and borrowing stable coins, (interest earned+interest paid) had little risk but would be the most rewarded with COMP governance.
Too many opinions
endless
@voodoorider, it must be before anyone knew of the COMP tokenâs existence. Once people knew of the token, know that it must be distributed somehow. Iâm not sure, but I imagine after the announcement, digital asset users flocked to supply their assets to Compound. This was a new concept, to earn interest + rewards on deposited funds. Compoundâs APY was already 10-50X from a traditional finance POV. At one point, I remember seeing +20% APY!
So, after the announcement is too late for âEarly Userâ distribution. Early users risked capital without being rewarded Compound Governance Token (COMP). Youâve heard of banks giving you $100 if you open an account by xx/xx/20xx, right? What if you already had an account? What if you open an account the day after? Same principle here.
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Itâs been a couple of weeks since I mentioned two lingering issues with the interest analysis, particularly surrounding handling of cToken transfers. These issues proved more time-consuming to untangle than Iâd anticipated â yâall early power-users sure gave the protocol a thorough testing but created quite the mess of transactions and transfers to untangle (good job!)
Iâve updated the github repo with corrections that address those lingering issues. The early user interest list is also updated; the previously posted link now points to the new list, or you can use the quoted link below. For most users, there will be either no difference or a small relative difference in interest recorded. If you transferred cTokens among several addresses, you may see your accrued interest redistributed somewhat over those addresses.
I have sanity-checked the results across a healthy cross-section of addresses with diverse transaction histories. Still, I invite everyone to review and flag any further edge cases that may still be lurking in the analysis.
Iâm excited to see the community use these data to move forward with a proposal that serves the protocol well.
With my work on the early-user interest analysis coming to a close, I am eager to re-enter the conversation about how the community should use these data to inform a proposal. However, to avoid any potential conflicts of interest, I will continue to refrain from opining on proposal formulation (beyond my earlier enumeration of logical next steps) until after the grant that supported this analysis is fully closed.
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I am a bit afraid and share my concerns with @Fishbtc and others that we are missing the point of this airdrop with making ârich richerâ and only rewarding super early users and moreover those who earned the most using the platform. The beauty of Uniswap airdrop (I agree,a bit communist but powerful 
and its marketing impact (letâs face it - it became legendary) was the simplicity of just and even distribution. I think for Compound to extend its range and strenghten its position in Ethereum ecosystem would be to reach as much users as possible.
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Can we also produce a list using the originally proposed cut off date of 08/06/2020?
This way a decision can be made by the community on how to distribute based based on the full data set.
Looking forward to see some progress in the airdrop soon :). Thanks everyone who helped to reach to this point.
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thanks for your helpingâŚ
we hope the proposal can release to vote soon.
When does the grant expire?
My understanding is that it will be closed out with the grant committeeâs next disbursement from the committee multisig. I donât have an exact timeline, but past precedent would suggest within 1-3 weeks.
Also to @Sku 's point, I agree with the spirit of providing all the data we can to inform discussion, with the gentle reminder that there is already strong resistance to cut-off dates beyond the COMP announcement from some of the largest token-holders documented in this thread. Folks who are interested can find the data for a June 8th cut-off date here. The major difference on the whale side of this list is the sudden rise of a smart contract controlled by Dharma, whose Compound integration grew dramatically during this Feb-Jun period. I should add a technical note that the script had to be modified to generate these data by capping the number of âbucketsâ for the market history data at 500 instead of sampling daily; the later date results a number exceeding the maximum number of buckets accepted by Compound API, but the impact of this adjustment on the estimated interest is negligibly small.
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Distribution Method:
I believe that time contributing to the protocol holds as much value/weight as any financial contribution and should be rewarded as such. Having said that, I suggest:
Comp Accrue Period = Time between first live completed compound block until announcement date block (2017 - 2020) Roughly 2.7 years
Comp Vest Date = First Comp Interaction/Contribution Date by Wallet - Comp Accrue Period (2.7 give or take)
So if you have been contributing to the protocol for 2.7 years you should vest before others that started contributing to the protocol for letâs say 1 year.
To me this provides the most value and support to both sides of the coin. Time and Money.
Love to hear any thoughts on this recommendation.
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So what happens if the grant expires without concluding on airdrop? Just asking for information. Thanks
I can see the appeal in theory of vesting at different speeds depending on how early a user interacted with the protocol. I also think it is technically feasible with existing code in the Comptroller, specifically by borrowing the _setContributorCompSpeed() function.
That said, here are some of the significant challenges I would anticipate with time-weighted vesting schedules:
- My hunch is that using the
_setContributorCompSpeed()function to assign different vesting schedules for each early user would be a highly gas-intensive operation. Other major projectsâ (e.g. UNI, FORTH) token distributions have used a Merkle root distributor approach that effectively requires the user to pay part of the gas associated with the distribution. - This use of
setContributorCompSpeed()would be a dramatic deviation from its intended use, and a separate solution would be needed to finish vesting by resetting those speeds on a per-user basis in a way that doesnât require further intervention by governance. - Thereâs potential for disagreement over whether someone who supplied capital and quickly withdrew it within a few blocks early in the protocolâs operations should vest at a faster rate than someone who supplied one day later and never redeemed / still holds those cTokens.
- To the point about honoring âtime and moneyâ in the distribution, this is precisely the purpose of using total interest earned/paid as the weight factor for proposing a distribution. On a standard linear vesting schedule, if two users supplied the same amount of capital (and never withdrew) but one started much earlier, the early bird would accrue more vested COMP per hour than the newer one because of the greater interest they earned overall. So we could make the case that adjusting the vesting schedules by date of first contribution is âdouble-countingâ the time element.
Overall I think a constant vesting rate for every address eliminates this question and also simplifies the implementation, but welcome additional opinions on this.
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Were the contributors paid or did they volunteer? If they volunteered then I agree with you.
In case you already being paid with a COMP token, do you think that this would lead to greater centralization? Or does the term âdecentralized financeâ serve solely as a narrative?
Personally, I think contributors deserve more than other users (and get more) but how much more?
If the goal of the planned airdrop is to increase decentralization then such a method of calculation does just the opposite
So would see it as two distinct levels of engagement.
Contributor is anyone engaging/using/interacting with the protocol prior to the existence of the comp governance token. Without those users or contributors early engagement and support in the protocol, like many others it would have fizzled away.
Developers or those contributing directly to the maintenance of the protocol or âcodeâ is different and would be associated with compound labs or have been provided a grant for development type work.
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