Summary
Timeline: From 2025-06-06 To 2025-06-08
Total Issues: 3 (0 resolved)
Critical Severity Issues: 1 (0 resolved)
High Severity Issues: 2 (0 resolved)
Overview
Proposal 445 aims to fund the creation of campaigns to grow Unichain markets. The initiative, led by AlphaGrowth, focuses on increasing and retaining TVL in the existing USDC and ETH lending markets on Unichain.
We have confirmed that the proposal will execute successfully and transfer 16,100 COMP tokens to AlphaGrowth’s multisig.
Proposal Details
- Proposal ID: 445
- Type: Growth Campaign
- Proposer: bryancolligan
- Creation Transaction: 0x9ae83158baf538461783239eafc3c7da270ad317ea3f580a456c71a7ad264a7d
- Creation Block: 22646166
- Creation Date: Jun-06-2025 02:33:23 PM UTC
Critical Severity
On-chain Payload Incongruence
The [AlphaGrowth] Unichain Growth Program Campaign forum post, linked from the description of Proposal 445, proposes a base compensation structure in COMP equivalent to USD 300K. Of the total base compensation, USD 100K worth of COMP tokens would be released immediately, with the remaining amount streamed using a Sablier vault over the 90-day program window.
However, the on-chain proposal’s actions contradicts the previously proposed compensation structure by proposing an up-front lump-sum payment of 16,100 COMP (the entire budget). This increases the risk to the DAO significantly as there would be no recourse available if the full compensation is paid up front.
Consider aligning the on-chain proposal data with that of the full proposal as the on-chain proposal does not enact the full proposal as communicated to the community.
High Severity
Lack of Transfer Controls
The proposal transfers 16,100 COMP to AlphaGrowth, of which 9,200 COMP is intended for incentives. There are no safeguards to ensure the incentive allocations are used as proposed.
The proposal does not justify a need to custody funds for incentives; however, a recent proposal has provided a flexible solution for secure delegated treasury operations which supports the use of decentralized applications. Consider using an Avatar Safe configured with a Zodiac module that constrains multisig transactions to only those proposed. This method allows the DAO to retain control of allocated COMP and ensures funds are used as intended.
Trusted Intermediaries
The proposal transfers COMP-based incentives to AlphaGrowth instead of directly to distribution mechanisms. Additionally, AlphaGrowth proposes transferring the allocated COMP to unspecified Distribution Partners. The proposer (and by extension the DAO) would be allocating COMP incentives to these partners as trusted intermediaries.
The use of such intermediaries is worth noting as it means COMP tokens leave the control of the DAO and the proposer and would be held by a third party responsible for their distribution. However, there is no information provided on the trusted distribution partners to which the proposer would effectively be delegating the DAO’s trust. The DAO would have no oversight over these trusted intermediaries who would have control of the COMP received. If COMP is not used as proposed the DAO would have no recourse.
Consider providing the DAO with more information regarding the distribution partners. In addition, it is recommended to use a solution which constrains the ability of the distribution partners to use COMP only in the intended ways. Such solutions have been offered in other proposals.
Conclusion
The proposal is narrowly scoped with the goal to drive protocol growth on Unichain. A total nominal allocation of 16,100 COMP is made for incentivizes distribution to compound users as well as for operations, marketing and integrations. Specific breakdowns of incentive distributions have been detailed in the forum discussion, mirroring the process utilized to grow TVL during Arbitrum’s LTIPP.
The proposal marked a shift from previous proposals and indicated the intention to use a Sablier vault to stream the majority of the compensation portion of the COMP allocation requested. However, the on-chain proposal does not reflect this intention and transfers the entire budget at the time of enactment. Additionally, two other issues were raised for the DAO’s attention, relating to a lack of transfer controls on COMP allocated to incentives and the use of unnamed trusted intermediaries.
Due to the incongruence in on-chain proposal payload and the actions described in the full proposal, we recommend cancelling the current proposal.