[AlphaGrowth] Unichain Growth Campaign

Proposals
1

Overview & Opportunity

UNI incentives and organic growth has skewed Unichain’s TVL heavily toward Uniswap. $460m of liquidity has been deposited across spot and CL pools. Yet, Compound V3 only has around $5m in Supply:

  • 600k in USDC
  • $4.7m in ETH

There is a $100-200MM addressable market for USDC and ETH lending on Unichain, and Compound markets live, and ready to entrench a first-mover network effect on the chain.

TVL Growth Strategy

  1. Incentiveize Stablecoin Supply - [20-40% of Incentives.]

During Arbitrum’s LTIPP, we learned that rewarding supply produces growth. When Compound streamed ARB exclusively to USDC and USDT lenders, supply TVL climbed from ~$92 million to $266 million an increase of 180%, and every dollar of ARB pulled in roughly $139.

On Unichain we propose funnelling 20-40% of the COMP incentive budget to USDC and USDT0 denominated supply, paid out via Distribution partners.

  1. Incentivize ETH Supply for Loopable LSTs / LRTs - [15-30% of Incentives.]

Organic use of the ETH Market on Unichain is focused on the following loops:

  • weETH / ETH @ $2.6m in collateral.
  • wstETH / ETH @ $1.76m in collateral.

ETH Staking Yield provides organic demand for looped leverage, but this activity is constrained by supply. When the utilization rate of the ETH market reaches the kink, the spike in borrow APR makes these LST / LRT Loop trades unprofitable.

You can see evidence of this in the ezETH collateral listing:

  • ezETH / ETH @ $0 in collateral.

weETH and wstETH Loopers are eating up all of the ETH supply, and the APR for ETH Supply has not met the required hurdle rate for more deposits. Even though ezETH is listed as collateral, the market needs more supply to grow.

We propose directing 15-30% of the COMP incentive budget to ETH denominated supply, paid out via Distribution Partners.

  1. Structured-product partner vaults - [10-30% of Incentives.]

Yield products and vaults during LTIP proved that white glove strategies can bring incremental dollars that self-manage health-factors and auto-loop capital. We will reserve 20% of incentives for whitelisted vaults that lock funds for ≥ 30 days, ensuring alignment. Partners receive streaming COMP only while vault TVL is maintained, creating a built-in claw-back if deposits leave early.

We will highlight the loop mechanic through partner dashboards so traders can form one-click, 2-3x recursive positions.

  1. Unichain Conditional Funding Markets.

The Uniswap Foundation has signalled a June/July CFM grant round. CFMs, Conditional Funding Markets, are a form of futarchy - which uses prediction markets as a governance mechanism, and are an experiment into how we make funding decisions in a decentralized way. In the Uniswap Foundation’s first implementation of CFMs, Forecasters will predict the specific amount of TVL a lending protocol will generate on Unichain over three months if the team receives the grant. The UF will allocate two grants of $450,000 each based on the results of the CFMs, and the teams will use that grant in an attempt to maximize their TVL growth.

While nothing is guaranteed, quick wins on Unichain will increase Compound’s chance to co-finance growth campaigns. We encourage Compound to apply to participate in the CFM when applications are announced in a few weeks.

AlphaGrowth will champion a matching proposal so that every COMP dollar is effectively doubled by Uni tokens, halving the effective incentive spend while keeping APYs attractive. Our target is $200-500k in matched funds, and we will coordinate timelines so that the Uni grant starts as COMP emissions ramp down, smoothing APRs and reducing “cliff” risk at campaign end.

  1. Gamified quests & referral funnels - [5-10% of Incentives.]

High engagement quests were a silent workhorse in LTIPP: Layer3 and similar platforms drove a material share of first-time wallet creation at minimal cost. We will dedicate 5% of the incentive pool to a Layer3 or similar quest series that requires a qualifying deposit (≥ $100) and a seven-day holding period. This approach blends education with light gamification to seed long-tail wallets that historically exhibit better retention than airdrop farmers.

Together, these five tactics recreate the proven Growth levers which led to our success on Arbitrum. We will tailor these strategies for distribution on Unichain.

KPIs & Milestones

Our success framework revolves around four measurable objectives that tie directly to Compound’s bottom line and Unichain’s network effects:

  1. $100m TVL in 90 days

Our primary KPI is TVL growth. Reaching this threshold not only validates product market fit but also unlocks economies of scale in risk parameters.

  1. Utilization at an average of 60%

TVL by itself is insufficient unless borrowers put it to work. We therefore target an average utilization rate of 60 percent, calculated over rolling two-week windows during the campaign. Maintaining that level confirms that borrow demand is healthy, reserve fees accrue to the treasury, and lenders see competitive yields without over-risking the markets.

  1. Retain 70% of peak TVL, 30 Days after emissions end

Short term mercenary capital undermines long term profitability, so retention is a core KPI.

  1. Secure at least $100-$500k in UNI tokens

To multiply the impact of DAO funds, AlphaGrowth will pursue Unichain’s forthcoming futarchy grants and other co-marketing pools. Our milestone is to secure a minimum of $100-500 k in Uni tokens by the end of the quarter. Matching capital of that magnitude effectively doubles depositor APR without draining additional COMP from the treasury.

Budget & Request to the DAO

To achieve the Unichain growth targets, we are asking the DAO to approve $700k in COMP budget.

  1. $400k in COMP incentives.

With $400k in COMP and similar budget in UNI AlphaGrowth will mirror the dollar denominated spend that proved so effective on Arbitrum and ensures the APR remains predictable for depositors from day one.

  1. $300k in COMP for operations, marketing, and integrations.
  • $300k will be released up front to cover immediate integration work, strategy and marketing execution.

These funds pay for analytics dashboards, weekly KPI reporting, creative assets, Layer3 quest fees, and the BD hours required to secure matching grants from Unichain’s forthcoming futarchy program.

  1. Performance Bonus

To align AlphaGrowth’s upside with the DAO’s, we propose a performance bonus of $50 k in COMP for every additional $10 million of net TVL above the $100 million target, payable only after an independent audit confirms balances and retention 30 days post-campaign. This success fee is conditional: if we fall short, the DAO owes nothing beyond the base, and any unused incentives automatically revert to the treasury.

In sum, the DAO’s commitment is capped at $700k in COMP, and a results-based bonus that rewards over-performance while protecting downside.

Approving this budget equips Compound to seize Unichain’s liquidity window:

  • Drive up to $100-200 million in sticky deposits.
  • Add an estimated $0.5-1.5 million in annual reserves.
  • Perform as a leading protocol in Unichain’s Futarchy incentives competition.

Closing

Compound’s growth team has already demonstrated that targeted, data-driven incentives can outperform competitors by 7.7x on a dollar on dollar basis. Unichain is the next high liquidity frontier, and the window to capture it is now before rival money markets arrive. Backing this proposal lets Compound lock in the network effect, generate an estimated $750k in new annual reserves for a 12 Month ROI at $100MM TVL and 7 Months at $200MM.

Due to the time sensitive nature of Unichain opportunity AlphaGrowth will run this campaign and handoff and align to the Compound Foundation assuming the DAO votes in a Foundation.

Looking forward to comments and feedback.

6 Likes
2

I think this is a great idea for growth, especially given the opportunity on Unichain and the momentum building with all the recent news around the Foundation.

Today’s Q&A Discord Space with the Foundation felt productive and supportive of Compound’s integration, but with the Foundation still getting feedback and shaping its proposal, we’ve already seen some missed opportunities. It was even mentioned on the call that the competition in DeFi is always moving fast.

That being said, this feels like a great move for the time being. And will help Compound keeping building momentum and stay ahead while the Foundation comes together.

1 Like
3

Excited at the prospect of Compound investing in growing its presence on Unichain! Keep an eye on UF socials for application info on CFMs next month.

3 Likes
4

I’m generally very supportive of this. I’d love to see more details of the financial impact this is expected to bring to Compound.

3 Likes
5

Here is a rough ROI calculator on the Unichain Compound market.
used a couple of rough variables: Spend, TVL, Utilization, rate differential, Borrows to collaterals.

While the variables flucate depending on configs and market they are conservative and common comparable with other existing markets.

With higher rate differential, LTV’s, utilization the ROI changes

4 Likes
6

This proposal presents a structured, performance-based growth plan that aligns well with Compound DAO’s fiduciary and strategic goals.

From a legal and treasury stewardship standpoint, the following points stand out:

  • Accountability: Clear fund allocation and milestone-based bonuses ensure transparency and reduce misuse risk.
  • Incentive Alignment: The success fee is conditional on third-party verified outcomes protecting the DAO from unwarranted payouts.
  • Capital Efficiency: Leveraging matching UNI incentives effectively doubles depositor APRs without doubling COMP spend.
  • Risk Mitigation: Sablier streams, regular KPI reporting, and independent audits provide strong governance safeguards.

Backing this proposal means Compound can capture early network effects on Unichain while maintaining treasury discipline and operational integrity.

3 Likes
7

Gauntlet is generally supportive of Unichain growth initiatives. To evaluate this proposal, it would benefit the community to understand more detail on the Operations, Marketing, and Integration budget.

We’d like to better understand the budget specifics for the 90-day incentive campaign. To clarify, AlphaGrowth and partners are proposing to be paid $300k to distribute $400k of COMP while planning on handing off the campaign to the proposed Compound Foundation (pending DAO approval)?

Additional transparency on the budget breakdown would help the DAO understand the scope of effort involved and provide a useful benchmark for future campaigns.

1 Like
8

Estimated Budget Breakdown

Thank you for your general support @Gauntlet We’ve have an estimated budget breakdown to clarify the scope of execution and emphasize high-leverage activities critical to Unichain’s Compound deployment.

AlphaGrowth’s campaign is not passive distribution effort. We saw the LTIP on arbitrum take 3 full time people along with the other 4 Core Compound Growth team members. We think it will take a similar effort to get unichain off the ground. The full AlphaGrowth team will be available to make sure this campaign is successful as well.Multiple skillsets will be needed to deploy effectively across integrations, channels, developments, marketing, design and new campaign launches. This is a structured 90 day sprint to secure liquidity, negotiate asset alignment, incentivize ecosystem partners, and prove we can do it again.

While we don’t know the exact budget execution will be as we will need to respond to market in real time here is an estimated Budget Breakdown:

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Category Allocation USD
Growth Ops & Program Design 30% $90,000
Asset & Yield Negotiation 20% $60,000
Liquidity Partner Activation 20% $60,000
Channel Partner Incentive Alignment 20% $60,000
Reporting & Analytics 5% $15,000
Program Management & DAO Handoff 5% $15,000
Total 100% $300,000

Components of Budget Breakdown Value

  • Negotiated Asset & Yield Partnerships: We’ll engage top LST, LRT, and stablecoin counter party demand(BTC->USDC) to deploy and co-market their asset loops on Compound Unichain.

  • Liquidity Partner Activation: Partner onboarding ensures vault loopers, market makers, and structured yield participants are aligned with campaign timing.

  • Channel Partner Distribution Infrastructure: Growth architecture, incentives tracking, and real-time adjustment incentive ops.

  • Incentive Experiments: Coordination with UniV4 hooks, Wallets, Bridges, and channel partners ensures campaign virality, with a smooth UX experience and measurable adoption.

Let us know if this works and is what you were looking for. We can project deeper breakdowns on cost-per-acquisition, campaign funnels, or partner BD terms however until we are in the trenches we won’t have actual numbers.

3 Likes
9

Unichain incentives application will be launching next week, Please provide any feedback or changes the community would like to see before we send the proposal to onchain vote tomorrow.

1 Like
10

Overall, I think this is a strong improvement over the past couple growth proposals –– primarily because it’s a more focused scope/timeline vs. open ended growth projects.

That said, I believe there’s still room to improve the Approach/TVL Strategy portion of the proposal:

Generally speaking vs. feedback on a specific point –– while incentives clearly work in the short term, they’re also costly and often lack long-term stickiness. I’d love to see growth strategies that don’t rely so heavily (50%+) on simply ‘giving away tokens.’ Yes, it attracts users — but those users often leave the moment incentives dry up and are onto the next. We’ve seen this cycle for years. For example, while Arbitrum TVL saw a spike during incentivized periods, it has since dropped significantly and TVL is no where near ~$266M (see current market numbers below). Once the rewards stopped, so did those users. That kind of churn doesn’t meaningfully grow the protocol over the long run.

Arbitrum markets as of this post:

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Of the items proposed, #3 (Partner Vaults) and #5 (Gamified Quests) stand out. Though still incentive-driven, they carry more depth and engagement than basic rate boosts. I’d encourage shifting more of the budget toward strategies like these (or others), and away from vanilla rate-boosting incentives (currently proposed at ~35–70% of the budget between stables + ETH incentives in section 1 of the plan). As another idea to throw out: what about “rate boost for migrating borrow from another lending protocol” or similar.

Lastly, and separate of the general strategy, the performance-based incentive structure feels off. A 30-day window is short, easily gamed, and introduces unpredictable future costs. I’d prefer the focus remain on delivering impact within the proposal’s primary scope (and amending as needed), rather than layering in an open-ended bonus structure.

Appreciate the work here — this is definitely a big step in the right direction. Also, fwiw, I think if the budget for this was 1/2 of what the total is, I’d care less about such a large focus on vanilla incentives/rate boosting and would be “worth trying” and seeing where things are some 3-6 months after the incentives have ended.

1 Like
11

Hey Jayson,

Welcome back, and thank you for engaging with the Unichain growth proposal. Your feedback is thoughtful as always, and we appreciate the strategic depth in your critique. Below, we will address your key points while providing context behind our decisions and modeling assumptions.

On Incentive Efficiency and the Arbitrum LTIP as a Benchmark

While it’s true that raw TVL on Arbitrum peaked during incentive periods and later tapered, it’s important to assess retained capital efficiency of 40% TVL retained on post-incentives, not just headline numbers.

  • Before the Arbitrum LTIP began, Compound’s TVL on Arbitrum was ~$50M.
  • After the campaign, a retained TVL of over $140M remains, with $60M actively utilized.
  • At an estimated 1% spread, that utilization equates to $600K in annual reserve growth, a meaningful return on program spend.

Using this data as a proxy, the Unichain campaign is projected to break even within 12–14 months as seen in this model: Unichain-Compound ROI - Google Sheets

A reasonable payback window for DeFi acquisition campaigns. While we don’t know the exact retention of TVL historically we see a 40% retention across DeFi projects.

On Growth Strategy Attention

We appreciate the alternative growth approaches you outlined and want to respond to each:

1. Partner Vaults

We’re fully aligned here. Vault integrations atop Compound on Unichain represent exactly the kind of composable, product-led growth that can drive sticky TVL. We are actively sourcing partners and plan to roll out vault integrations over the next 3 months, especially with the flexibility offered by Uniswap V4 infrastructure. While this is not yet live, it will be actively explored and resourced for deployment in the next 2 months.

2. Borrow Migration Incentives

We agree that the concept of “competitive displacement” via borrow migration is strong, and we agree on its potential. However, launching a new integration or toolset on Compound typically takes 3-9 months, and the Unichain campaign has a fixed 3-month window.

Given the time constraints, we have prioritized strategies that are immediately deployable and won’t cause us to miss the first-mover advantage for partnerships and upcoming Unichain grant opportunities. This is long term valuable, but not executable within this campaign’s lifecycle. We are open to adding this during a longer engagement period of 6 months.

3. Gamified Quests

While quests can drive short-term engagement, our data from past campaigns shows they underperform in retaining TVL post-campaign. We still need to execute on quests as it will bring in large capital providers from time to time but it is not as consistent as other strategies. We found quests are typically most effective in consumer Token meme coins or NFT verticals, less so in money markets where capital depth and stickiness are key. This will be fun and attention grabbing, but inefficient if our ultimate goal is TVL and utilization. This is why we had it as a very small part of the execution.

On Performance-Based Compensation

We respectfully disagree on the critique of performance based compensation. Without any upside alignment, growth vendors are structurally misaligned with the DAO. This creates a tragedy of the commons dynamic where rent seeking behavior of service providers or foundations come into play. When incentives are front loaded on the winning of the contract everything in the world can be promised. We prefer outcome linked meritocratic structures.

In particular, Partner Vaults and Structured product loops will take 6-8 weeks to initiate and the long term upside associated with them will last long beyond the 12-14 ROI window.

We’re open to refining how performance is measured (using time-weighted TVL or net utilization growth, Other Alternative KPIs or vesting conditions) but believe firmly that some performance based component is essential to protect DAO spend and ensure accountability.

Final Thoughts

Your push for durable strategies is valid. We agree that the next evolution of growth should blend token incentives with product driven mechanisms. However, early-stage chain expansion requires speed, coordination, and tactical TVL growth, which is why our approach leans into what has demonstrably worked. while building toward more sophisticated mechanisms.

Looking forward to future dialogue and collaboration.

AlphaGrowth Team

1 Like
12

I dig the response here!

Appreciate the notes across the board. Appreciate the model call out and diligence there — and while ‘pay for growth’ still has the same issues as I described, I can appreciate acknowledging this and wanting to iterate more from here vs. continue to burn to grow.

To elaborate a bit more here, generally when you spend this much or more on growth, there is some revenue or something to offset, so I’d love to see a focus on sustainable growth + revenue unlocking to help offset the spend over time. The age old web2 approach here is ‘you don’t have a growth program until you know the product works, otherwise you just have a good growth program and who knows.’ – Compound obviously has PMF. This is an amazing intersection where a Foundation focused on strategy and coordination across the board can also pitch in and everything works better together.

That being said, all of these points and previous points are comments on how I view these things vs. ‘non-starters’ in any way. The only thing I’m a bit stuck on still is performance-based compensation. The idea here is that anyone should be compensated for their work and that’s the number to figure out vs. open ended. Again, what’s stopping a few whales from working together and sharing in the performance upside when they just need 30 days of time with their funds. I’d like to think that having goals and meeting or exceeding them should give proof to do more projects vs. one-off performance that is open ended and can be gamed. Again, I would strongly encourage AG to have a single line item for their compensation vs. the open-ended approach. I’m also but just one voice in the community, but that’s my take here.

Love the open dialogue and hope everyone continues to discuss in such a way. Great to see it.

2 Likes
13

Talking internally we believe it would be economically infeasible to sustain TVL on a 50 basis points or .5% commission over $100MM for 90 days. The cost of capital would simply be to high.

Would you be amenable to an adjustment from 30 days to 90 days post-campaign.
Again this would be after an independent audit confirms balances and a DAO vote would need to pass for the commission.

1 Like
14

In terms of performance-based commission, extending the window in which it’s triggered is a big step in the right direction. If this approach is moving forward, the most impactful levers to refine further would be one or multiple of the below:

  • Increasing the threshold for each trigger (e.g. every $25M over target instead of every $10M)
  • Capping the number of times the bonus can be earned (e.g. “up to 5x”)
  • Linking the payout to % over target, a 10% increase over $100M TVL results in 10% bonus compensation (vs. the proposed, which I believe is ~16.6%)

Of those, the cap feels especially important to help bound the overall cost and allow it to be more predictable (will cost the DAO between $x-$y vs. $x-infinity).

For example, if the $100M TVL goal is hit exactly, and those assets simply rise in value by 10% (without new supply), the DAO would owe $50k. It’s easy to imagine scenarios like this adding cost without necessarily driving new outcomes.

Another helpful way to frame it: independent of the incentives themselves (which I think are well scoped), what is the operational cost of running the program? As proposed, there’s a $300k base cost to the DAO. If TVL reaches $150M, it would owe an additional $250k in bonuses (5 x $50K), meaning a total cost of $550k to distribute $400k in incentives. I’m not sure paying $550k is an appropriate operational cost there.

The last thought here is that TVL may just not be the best metric for measuring success. A better lens might be market share — for example, what was Compound’s share of the Arbitrum lending market before its incentive program, and how did that change over time? TVL alone can be misleading, since it’s heavily influenced by price fluctuations. Compound could reach $500M in TVL on a new chain, which sounds impressive, but if that ranks 19th in market share and dropped from 16th to 19th during that time, the TVL number loses its significance.

Overall, I think performance-based compensation can work if structured a bit differently — particularly with clear caps in place such that the total operational cost could not exceed $500k. The key is ensuring that costs stay aligned with the actual value delivered. Success should naturally lead to more growth programs down the line, alongside compensation that’s meaningfully correlated with delivering positive outcomes.

1 Like
15

Original Budget Structure
The original request for this program was a $500,000 operational expense covering strategy, campaign execution, and reporting. We revised the structure to reduce the cost and align towards performance-based variable compensation. This change was made specifically to address community concerns about aligning incentives more closely with DAO success while reducing upfront cost.

The bonus mechanism is structured to remain consistent with the original $500,000 ask. The proposed 0.5% commission is conservative relative to other projects where we charge 2-3% of TVL acquired as a standard outcome-based engagements.

Retention Windows and Price Volatility
Delaying performance measurement and TVL retention evaluation too far beyond the campaign increases exposure to external market volatility. The original 30-day post-campaign window is designed to assess traction while minimizing the variance from broader market movements. Extending this window to 90 days or more will drag the signal away from campaign effectiveness toward macro-driven outcomes. The closer the evaluation is to the campaign window, the more aligned attribution will be. Looking at past data from peak to trough was around 60 days after incentive distribution on arbitrum. So maybe that’s the best date.

Bonus Caps and Predictability
We agree with the need for cost certainty. In a scenario where TVL exceeds $200 million, we are open to capping the total performance bonus at $500,000. This provides the DAO with a predictable range of potential outcomes.

Increasing Threshold Triggers
Limiting commission to arbitrarily high thresholds thresholds (every $25M) can create motivation cliff effects that will discourage incremental wins.

TVL vs. Market Share
Market share is an important metric, particularly for assessing token valuation and competitive positioning. That said, reserve growth is driven by borrowing activity, which is dependent on market configurations and risk parameters. TVL is the closest leading indicator to borrowing potential. In early-stage chain expansion, TVL liquidity represents opportunity both in revenue and protocol relevance. For this reason, TVL growth remains a primary objective. However, we support incorporating other KPIs if they make sense.

We would like to propose the following structure, with capped upside at $200MM TVL, and 60 day measurement window.

2 Likes
16

Long term Compound user here. $300k-$500k for 90 days of work is equivalent to $1.2m-$2m for a year. Assuming a full time BD’s paid $100k/year, this seems to be equivalent to 12-20 people working full time, which does seem a bit off, but I’m not a BD so what do I know :joy:.

Like the many directions the proposal pointed out though. Shows expertise. I also like the points regarding short term incentives not keeping it up in the long term, as we users are impatient and yield seeking, so a longer period (maybe longer than 60 days?) for performance measurement post draining up the incentives seems more reasonable.

I’d also say if we can keep up 100M TVL even within the incentive period, it’s pretty impressive, because $400K total incentives for 3 months is equivalent to $400k * 4 / $100M = 1.6% in APR, which is not that much difference when spread out over this large amount of fund.

2 Likes
17

We wanted to proactively address the removal of the following line from the original proposal:

“$200K will vest via Sablier over the same 90-day horizon.”

The decision to remove this clause was driven by two key factors:

  1. Operational Agility and Timing
    The 90-day window for the Unichain growth campaign is extremely short, and time-to-execution is critical. Cancelling the current Proposal and relying on the current Sablier setup could introduce unnecessary delays at a time when immediate coordination and deployment are required.
  2. Upcoming Streaming Alternatives
    We are aware of a new streaming process currently under development that may better serve both operational needs and DAO transparency.

That said, we remain fully committed to accountability and transparency. If the DAO prefers to implement an escrow arrangement, either via a community multi-sig or in partnership with CGWG as escrow, we are fully open to that solution. We view this as a collaborative process and are happy to accommodate the preferences of the governance community.

Please don’t hesitate to share feedback or raise concerns. Our goal is to deliver results quickly and efficiently, while staying aligned with community standards and expectations.

AlphaGrowth Team

18

Thank you for the thoughtful feedback and for being a long-term Compound user. Your comment highlights a common and important tension: how to evaluate cost in DAO operations, especially when comparing traditional employment benchmarks to specialized outcome driven engagements.

Let’s break down three key points:

1. Cost vs. Outcome: A Misaligned Comparison

It’s natural to compare a $300K $500K engagement over 90 days to annualized basis. However this comparison assumes that this campaign is a pure commoditized labor substitute, which it’s not.

This proposal is not for a 3 person BD team. It will require time and attention from 6-8 specialized team members across multiple operations:

  • Strategic design and incentive architecture
  • Partner activation across and outside the Unichain ecosystem
  • Liquidity onboarding
  • Reporting and Governance interface and engagement
  • Real-time coordination with contributors and on-chain partners

To change up the conversation we can hypothetically reverse the logic: Would $100M in sticky TVL for $700K in services and incentives to be a good deal? If yes, then the cost discussion should be reframed as value-based, not headcount-based.

2. Market Benchmark: This Is What Top Talent Costs

As an example, top-tier growth and BD talent in DeFi and Web3 today regularly commands compensation starting in the $200K–$300K base range, with meaningful upside incentives. In fact, here’s an actual message an AlphaGrowth team member received recently (see attached), offering a $300K–$325K base + performance incentives for a Head of DeFi role.

DeFi-editted
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This reflects the reality: DeFi growth is a high-leverage, high-skill domain. The right people move markets, not just fill seats.

3. TVL Efficiency and Performance Windows

You make a great point on yield efficiency. A $400K incentive pool driving $100M TVL yields just a 1.6% APR which is exceptionally efficient in today’s market. Sustaining that even during the campaign is a strong result. Retaining it beyond is even stronger.

We initially proposed a 30 day post-campaign window for performance measurement to balance attribution with accountability. That said, we landed on 60 days, as any longer could introduce excessive volatility risk or noise from unrelated macro events. 60 days was also the peak to trough TVL window after the arbitrum LTIP campaign.

Appreciate the feedback and welcome continued discussion on how to structure growth partnerships.

— AlphaGrowth Team

19

Proposal 445 Review

OpenZeppelin reviewed Proposal 445 and disclosed a critical issue to AlphaGrowth. We recommended canceling the proposal and offered to help implement the governance actions proposed to the community in the forum to resolve the issue.

20

I’m late to the thread, sorry for the late-breaking input.

  • I support OZ’s recommendation to cancel the current proposal. The Sablier vesting line was deleted from this forum post after the on-chain proposal submission. That’s not right. Regardless of intent or soundness of rationale for the change, we should all hold one another accountable for ensuring that on-chain proposals match what was presented to the DAO in the forum.
  • Likelihood of winning Unichain Futarchy grant: Two grants will be issued, and currently according to DefiLlama, Euler and Morpho are the top two on Unichain by TVL, with Compound in third even though Compound was live on Unichain practically at chain launch and long before Euler. How will AlphaGrowth overcome the current long odds, the additional incentives likely to be offered by these competitors to earn a Futarchy grant; and the possibility of an upset Unichain deployment by Aave?
  • By the way, according to the official rules linked in their application, Unichain’s two futarchy grants for lending protocol growth are worth $400,000 each, not $450,000 (the extra $100,000 in the $900,000 grant budget is for a preview round of incentives).

Regarding the cost of the campaign, I agree with those who find it expensive and am not particularly swayed by the “cost of talent” arguments. It would make more sense to me if the argument were that AlphaGrowth has the necessary inroads with DeFi whales and orgs to deliver the target TVL. What are the consequences of not meeting the base KPIs? In the Compound Grants Program, meeting KPIs is a precondition for payment. It appears there are no consequences (other than reputational) if AlphaGrowth misses its KPI targets for this proposal. This seems like a woefully misaligned incentive structure.