Hello @arr00
I want to express some concerns I have regarding Uniswap governance processes with the introduction of this proposal.
If I understand correctly, cUNI voting is a binary situation, which means that all the cUNI tokens vote one way.
If you lend on Compound and lose the vote, your UNI tokens do the opposite of your will. It is much worse than if they did nothing.
It magnifies the whale dominance in Uniswap governance.
This system allows big UNI holders to hijack the UNI locked on Compound and leverage their voting power.
My estimates are that a whale could gain 2.5x boost on his/her UNI voting power with virtually no cost.
Here’s how it’s calculated:
There are 15m UNI available to vote as cUNI. Bob adds 15m UNI to the fray and wins the vote, thus 2xing his voting power.
Additionally, Bob borrows DAI for 9m UNI (60% collateral) and lends it using another Lending protocol for 60% of UNI = 5.4m UNI. Bob repeats the process one more time and gets another 1.944m UNI.
This leaves us at 37.344m UNI gained from 15m UNI, i.e. ~2.5x boost.
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I’ve pictured a scenario that is a little exaggerated, but it can easily be done on smaller, more subtle scale.
The important point here is that it can strongly feed into the whale power, or it can mildly feed into it.
But there’s no way it doesnt magnify the whale power, as the minority votes are turned against the minority with cUNI.