A number of key community members lack sufficient COMP to create governance proposals. We want to keep the proposal threshold high to avoid spam but also want to create a smooth governance experience for those dedicating time and effort to improving the protocol. Gaining sufficient delegation to a CAP isn’t a huge issue for one-off proposals/contributors but is more of a hassle for frequent contributors.
For example, Compound is now paying @getty indefinitely for contributing to the protocol but still requires him to rally 65k COMP to propose an improvement. Assuming Getty is the first of many contributors that have longer-term economic relationships with the Compound Protocol, it may make sense to grant these individuals special privileges in governance (namely, the right to propose).
One solution: create a whitelist of addresses that can create proposals. Rather than just checking to see if an address has 65k COMP delegated to it, we could also check to see if the proposer’s address is on a whitelist of trusted community contributors, allowing them to sidestep the COMP requirement.
@arr00 took the lead on ironing out the implementation details of this. The code below allows addresses to be whitelisted for a specified period of time, after which the special authority expires.
Still to decide:
- Who manages the whitelist — governance or a multisig?
- Proposals from whitelisted addresses can’t be canceled for falling below the proposal threshold, so perhaps we allow a multisig to cancel proposals from whitelisted proposers?
Admittedly, this is a pretty minor possible improvement on the governance process (and there are some hacky ways to accomplish a similar result), but the bigger point here is that we should be empowering key community contributors with the tools they need to contribute actively to the Compound Protocol (a mix of funding, resources, privileges, etc).