Why did you word the vote that way? Wouldnt it have been better to say:
Vote Option 1: Approve Growth Program Org Structure
Vote Option 2: Reject Growth Program Org Structure
I will take a break from posting for a bit. Trying to not deviate from the discussion above. Please answer my questions
I fail to see how an incentive program needs 35 people. For example, doesn’t Compound already have a security agreement with OpenZeppelin? Why would AlphaGrowth need even more? I fail to see how this adds value to Compound, personally.
I thought the KPIs weren’t defined yet, per the above initial post?
I have a problem with this line of thinking. I wouldn’t, personally, pay $6m for $10m in 12 months because there is no guarantee that the $10m will be realized. TVL can and will leave at some point, meaning the up-front payment puts the DAO at risk and costs for revenue not realized. I think the opposite way of thinking could be good. For every $1B, a “finder’s fee or bonus” of $1m could occur from realized revenue. This lowers the risk to the DAO.
Thank you @DudeCOMPONLY, this is a really constructive answer that helps us build sustainable systems for the DAO. As I understand it your objection to paying a commission is the possibility of paying out the commission before the revenue generated by the commissionable actions has been collected, which doesn’t align incentives between AlphaGrowth and the DAO to attract long term sticky investors.
Given that situation let’s propose a system that does align incentives:
A billion dollars takes time to accrue on Compound, it won’t be deposited as a lump sum. Therefore at the time of the commission request, some reserves will have been accrued by Compound specific to that $1B.
Operationally the Growth Team will put in a request to be paid commission each time the TVL on Compound increases by $1B due to the growth team’s direct involvement. This will gauge the DAO’s continued support of the system and our initiatives.
The request will deposit $5M of commission into an Aera Vault in COMP token at the current price of COMP. The Vault will initially have the Pre-Commission Reserve Increase amount unlocked (Which may be 5-20% of the commission depending on how long the $1B took to accrue. The vault will then linearly unlock the remaining commission over the next 12 months, such that if the TVL supplied by the Growth Team sees significant decreases the vault can be paused. Otherwise Reserve growth should parallel the linear unlock for the first year.
In this scenario, the Compound DAO commits to paying the commission, but doesn’t risk paying out commission until the commissionable action is achieved over time.
@DudeCOMPONLY would love to hear your feedback on this proposed solution.
I will be voting against the snapshot proposing this org structure. There are some aspects that seem reasonable to me, but I share literally all of Gauntlet’s concerns and find the answers at present to be far more swagger than substance. Attempting to turn the tables about the security budget on OpenZeppelin is particularly bizarre since it seems to telegraph intent to displace OZ and its $4M “elephant in the room” budget – I would say that’s projecting, because the real elephant in the room of this thread is AG’s $5M per $1B while AG claims every dollar of added TVL as AG-created TVL. AG has likely helped increase TVL, but clearly not every new dollar was delivered by AG.
For a performance-based ask of this scale, the DAO should insist on a more robust estimate for AG’s attributable added TVL, e.g. by comparing Compound’s TVL increase during AG’s engagement to TVL increases across all lending protocols, to establish a more realistic measure of AG’s impact versus the status quo.
@allthecolors Thank you for the response.
This is how we have framed our performance. https://dune.com/dima_woof/alpagrowth-x-woof
Which is solely displays the assets, markets and chains the growth program added.
A baseline to normalize the dollar denoted amount we also created a baseline denominated in ETH:
Would be great to understand what we should change in the current Dune dashboard to get to a clear baseline.
Happy to find out what makes sense to pursue and not to pursue from your side.
This is a much better system, and I think this lowers the risk to the DAO.
I’m from dHEDGE/Toros Finance, and over the past 6 months, we’ve had the pleasure of working closely with Alphagrowth/Grow Compound. Together, we executed multiple highly successful campaigns that drove significant user growth and a notable increase in TVL for both platforms. These initiatives showcased the strong synergy between Toros Finance and Compound, delivering measurable results and reinforcing the value of collaboration.
