[AlphaGrowth] Growth Program Organizational Structure

[rossgates]

Extreme Ownership

Extreme ownership has led to AlphaGrowth’s success within its existing business units. We plan to roll out the same organizational principles as the Compound Growth Program expands into additional business units (SubDAOs) each with a specific expertise.

Extreme ownership manifests itself as having a single team lead for each business unit who is responsible for the successes and failures of their entire unit. The team lead will be responsible for:

• Negotiating with AlphaGrowth and the Compound DAO to set realistic 1-year KPIs that if achieved would ensure the continued funding of their SubDAO’s initiatives.
• Negotiating with other SubDAO leads to coordinate around shared resources such as marketing incentive spend
• Hiring and managing their supporting team members
• Ensuring their SubDAO has set ambitious and achievable timelines that ultimately achieve their SubDAO’s 1-year goals.
• Monitoring their teams progress to make sure they are on track
• Negotiating for funding on behalf of their SubDAO (after their initial funding)

The failure of a SubDAO will fall upon the shoulders of its lead, in which case the Growth Program Leadership or DAO at large may at any time move to replace the team lead or re-assign them within the team to a position of lesser authority in order to improve the team’s operations and chances of success.

SubDAO KPIs

Rough KPIs will be included in the articles describing each SubDAO business unit. Explicit KPIs will be solidified over the first 6 months of the 2025 growth program. They will be solidified alongside the teams that will be performing the work to ensure SubDAO teams are bought in to ambitious yet realistic goals that if achieved will justify the expense of their SubDAO’s budget.

Fears

The gantt chart at the bottom of this document shows that while SubDAOs are separate business units with specialities, campaigns like adding a blockchain are not 1-1 run by a single SubDAO. Many campaigns will require multiple subDAO’s to collaborate. Therefore a single subDAO will have a hard time taking credit for the addition of specific TVL to Compound. While the Incentives team may run the campaigns that actually draw TVL, they would not have incentives to distribute without the New Chains team negotiating with Chains to acquire them, nor would they have markets to run their campaigns on without the Markets & Assets team organizing with protocols to add their tokens as collaterals and match the marketing incentives Compound plans to distribute. Therefore, while TVL is an adequate overarching KPI to judge the effectiveness of the entire growth program, SubDAO’s will need more specific KPIs to judge the quality of their work and the level of impact their contribution has on the success of their collaborators. We don’t want a system where KPIs double count TVL and each team take credit for bringing it, at the same time they are all a part of the process. New Chains KPIs could be # of chains actually deployed, and $ collected from those chains as incentives to be distributed. This KPI of course would also need to mesh with the KPIs of the other teams to ensure the New Chains team is incentivized to take money from chains with DeFi ecosystems large enough to support the KPI metrics of the growth program as a whole.

SubDAO Compensation

Compensation packages for SubDAO members will initially be set by AlphaGrowth leadership, with the intention that after establishing suitable leads for each SubDAO, that the leads will set the compensation for their subordinates with oversight from AlphaGrowth leadership to ensure responsible use of funds.

Highly specialized operators who can effectively execute their goals are a rare and valuable commodity in the blockchain industry. We plan to offer performance based incentives structures that align the monetary incentives of our team members with the success of Compound Protocol. This form of structure will incentivize team members to go above and beyond rather than striving for the bare minimum. Organizations can get sucked into the paradigm of buying Microsoft and IBM because they are “known quantities” even if they’re not the best possible future. Our incentive structure will equally encourage and reward members who take chances on brand new initiatives in the pursuit of pushing forward the edge of DeFi. While Compound is boring and secure, we’ll strive to put Compound at the front of the next wave in business evolution on top of blockchain, as one of the core primitives that enable it.

Performance Based Initiatives

The Growth Program’s aggregate KPI is the TVL it brings to Compound Protocol through markets, collaterals, and structured product partnerships that would not have existed without the Growth Program’s initiative to create them. As such, the budget includes a $5M bonus per $1B of additional TVL the Growth Program brings to Compound starting on the day that the renewal is passed. This statement is not set in code and it will be upon the DAO to honor its commitment when the proposition is proposed to reconcile the bonus post the Growth Team Performing excellently. Here’s why the DAO would want to honor it’s commitment.

This bonus will be used as part of the compensation structure for every participant of the Compound Growth Program to ensure the retention of top talent in an investment bank style structure that provides members a variable bonus that is a significant proportion of their annual salary … paid out in chunks should the member stay for 3-6 months after their bonus is determined. This gives team members golden handcuffs where they’d walk away from significant compensation for leaving the team. They also have the potential to make themselves financially successful for excellent performance in which the DAO treasury is the ultimate winner because reserves earned off increased TVL will accrue at a faster rate than the funds invested in the bonuses retaining an excellent team.

Fears

Performance based bonus’s must be sustainable, they must be smaller than the amount of revenue generated back to the DAO, otherwise parties will argue that a growth team is draining the treasury, even if that growth team’s actions set up the treasury to make 2-3x more the following year. Speaking from experience, company boards can be short sighted with performance based incentives, they over value growth up front, and undervalue it after the fact.

Currently the Compound Reserves (which represent Compound’s profit) increase by about $5M each year per $1B of utilized TVL on Compound. If an investor drops another $1B onto Compound for the duration of 1 year, Compound’s revenue will increase by roughly another $5M per year.

By paying a growth team $5M per $1B of new TVL, the protocol essentially pays out the first year of revenue on that capital as a Finder’s Fee, and then the protocol keeps the revenue earned from that TVL for every future year without paying a fee.

In traditional software startups, as long as the cost of acquisition (CAC) is lower than the lifetime value (LTV … not to be confused with TVL) of a customer, the company continues to grow sustainably. In this case, as long as new funds stay on Compound for longer than 1 year the lifetime value of the deposits in terms of Revenue to the Compound Treasury will be greater than the CAC, making the growth strategy a sustainable virtuous cycle.

Relationships in Growth can break down when delegates set milestones they believe to be unachievable for which they are willing to pay top dollar … yet after they’re achieved, Delegates look at the same goal and believe the compensation is too large. Everything is impressive until it’s proved possible, like the 4 minute mile, and then it’s not valued. It’s okay to negotiate compensation for the next duration of time, but post negotiation on work already provided is bad faith and kills the moral of teams who are told their strategies were too simple to be valuable, when those teams have spent years failing and failing to perfect and simplifying the strategies they’ve employed on behalf of their client.

I don’t recommend a programatic way to pay out AlphaGrowth based on new TVL as it will be dangerous and complicated to program before the markets and integrations are built. But knowing this dynamic, I do strongly request the community to honor whatever commitment it makes in a re-election process, as we will honor our duty to improve Compound.

We will always strive to transparently share risks and concerns with the business structures we put forward. If you have an additional concern; in the immortal words of Eminem, “Here, tell these people something they don’t know about me.”

Growth Program Org Chart

Roles

Who needs to be hired

The growth program is lining up team members for the teams it will comprise upon expansion. All the roles in gray are currently in negotiation, if you’re in the community and would like to become involved with a specific team, please comment below and we’ll reach out.

Team Crossover & Support

The 8 SubDAO’s in the Org Chart above are collaborative business units designed to accomplish more together than the sum of their parts. Each has and will hone a specific expertise, the same external partner may interface with every Compound team at a different stage of their partnership with the Compound DAO. For example, here’s a gantt chart for how Linea may interact with Compound as we deploy Compound on Linea and integrate cTokens with the MetaMask-MasterCard debit card.

1. Security is always present ensuring an incident free partnership
2. The DeFi Deal Team understands How Linea’s treasury might use the Compound deployment to manage their assets
   1. In parallel the New Chain team negotiates Linea through the 65 steps of adding Compound
3. A grant is given for the smart contract development
   1. While the TradFi team works with MasterCard on Debit Card partnerships
   2. And the DeFi Ops team understands how COMP token could play into the Debit Card
4. Upon Linea launching on chain the Community team (which contains marketing) is engaged to shout from the rooftops and let the community know about the new opportunity
5. New assets are added as collateral
   1. In exchange COMP and matching co-incentives are deployed on pools that use those collaterals to boost supply in a bull market where leveraged borrows are in high demand.

[mexilc]

@rossgates

By paying a growth team $5M per $1B of new TVL, the protocol essentially pays out the first year of revenue on that capital as a Finder’s Fee, and then the protocol keeps the revenue earned from that TVL for every future year without paying a fee

Cant this be gamed? Cant there be a backroom deal that brings in TVL for one year then it leaves but the fee has already been paid? im just asking the question because ive seen shady things in other DAOs (not this one)

I think a phased payment approach is better (Year 1: $1m, Year2: $2m, Year 3: $3m). maybe this needs more thoughtt

[mexilc]

@rossgates

The growth program is lining up team members for the teams it will comprise upon expansion. All the roles in gray are currently in negotiation, if you’re in the community and would like to become involved with a specific team, please comment below and we’ll reach out.

this team seems very big? so you’re asking Compound for funds to hire these people to work for AlphaGrowth? is that correct or am I misreading things?

I counted 35 boxes, that is really high

[Kyle]

It’s not a single team, it’s a collection of subDAOs, who are funded under the Growth Program, and there is an invitation for the community to step up and join in a role.

Due to the Bull Market, we currently have more opportunities than we have attention, and our team is spread thin across all of them.

For example:

• The Incentives and Structured Products Business Unit is specifically focused on Campaigns. The process of running campaigns is composed of much smaller campaigns for each structured product which distributes incentives. Each partner requires their own deals for matched grants, content for co-marketing, distribution of rewards, development for structured products, and performance analysis to make sure we don’t overpay in incentives for TVL.

We are currently in the middle of a campaign on Optimism, and we also have $1M in Mantle Incentives - waiting on the sidelines. Mantle is currently within an ecosystem wide incentive program, and the fact that we don’t have a team which is devoted entirely to Campaigns, means that $1M in grant funds is sitting idle while the rest of the Mantle Ecosystem has a party. – It also means that our attention is not focused as deeply on the OP Campaigns as we could be.

We are specifically missing out on easy $MNT grant matching opportunities, by not having enough bandwidth to run both campaigns at once - along with all of our other responsibilities.

Those campaign responsibilities increase with every chain that we add, and there are 4 more in the pipeline.

What the Gantt Chart above is explaining, is that as Compound Grows, our responsibilities for execution also grow – which increases the scope of the Growth Program.

.:.

This is especially the case, because we cannot simply increase collateral factors, and access the Billions in Looper TVL which represents over half of Aave’s borrows.

You mention here, that we should pursue innovative solutions:

Collateral Factors: How to Win the Lending Race

Stop copying Aave (emode) and Morpho (sandbox). Come up with something new or innovative. Copy paste wont make Compound a leader in antything

Each of these SubDAOs represents a specialized team, which is pursuing an innovative solution – and the structure described above, is about how these Business Units will give the DAO accountability and recourse as they pursue these solutions.

[mexilc]

I was reprimanded in Dms for that comment, so, not going to engage in that discussion again.

My main point is that the SubDao graphic shows 35 roles. Under who needs to be hired it shows 17 grey boxes, 18 not gray boxes. So 18 people are already working on these efforts? With what budget? We dont even have 18 people actively commenting in this forum

I personally dont think it takes 35 people. People can and should wear multiple hats /support multiple verticals like in any other job in any other industry.

[rossgates]

We’re going to create a snapshot vote on Monday 1/20/24 to make sure the Compound community supports moving this direction. We’ll post the link to the vote here when it’s live.

[Gauntlet]

Thank you for presenting this proposal. Several questions are below:

1. Accountability and Oversight

The proposal grants AlphaGrowth significant control over hiring, compensation, and SubDAO leadership. How will the DAO ensure AlphaGrowth remains accountable for its performance, resource allocation, and alignment with Compound’s long-term goals? At the outset, it seems like accountability is simply shifting from AlphaGrowth to the parties that they elect/hire. We don’t see any immediately obvious safeguards for addressing underperformance or mismanagement, which creates additional DAO risk exposure.

2. Redundant Org Structure

The proposed structure of 8 SubDAOs, with overlapping roles like a “DeFi Deal Team” and “New Markets & Assets Team,” appears duplicative. Other DAOs achieve effective growth with significantly leaner teams. Is the Compound DAO comfortable with this level of operational overhead, given the protocol’s current needs? What justifies such a sizeable overlapping structure, and how will it deliver value proportional to its substantial cost?

3. Alignment and Sustainability of Incentives

Why is $5M—equivalent to the first year of revenue—considered the optimal fee per $1B of TVL? V3 has only been live for two years. Paying a bonus equivalent to the entire first year of earned revenue appears disproportionate, as it front-loads costs without prior outcomes demonstrating sustained TVL or offsetting revenue in subsequent years. Additionally, this approach may onboard low-quality chains or assets, increasing protocol risk without generating meaningful or sustainable revenue to justify it.

4. Resource Allocation and Transparency

The proposal requests substantial hiring resources. What is the rationale for the size and scope of the team? For example, why is a dedicated security pod proposed when OpenZeppelin already manages Compound’s security needs? Open Zeppelin should be meaningfully resourced, given that the DAO spends $4M annually on their services. We are unsure why we need more security resources when the protocol isn’t regularly shipping feature upgrades. Furthermore, the total budget request (9,200 COMP) has not decreased from prior asks despite questions about its size in the previous renewal thread. Assessing the proposal’s efficiency or impact is difficult without clear details on how these funds will be allocated or managed.

5. KPIs and Performance Metrics

The proposal asks the DAO to approve performance bonuses upfront while deferring explicit KPI definitions for six months. How will the DAO find a clear basis to evaluate success or enforce accountability if KPI definitions are deferred for two quarters? How will AlphaGrowth ensure clear, measurable outcomes from the outset to provide accountability for the DAO?

[bryancolligan]

To be direct compound can have long period of managed decline or we right now can change the trajectory of the DAO which is the core of this proposal. We are here to build our success of the past and work for the Compound DAO. The fear of this proposal and direction is a bit scary for the status quo and may not work. Do nothing and we will decline. We are looking to try something innovative, today we can shift the current paradigm. This is about vision, leadership, and extreme ownership, a model designed for Compound into its next era of dominance.

Skepticism, meet reality, one response at a time.

“How will the DAO ensure accountability for AlphaGrowth? The safeguards against underperformance or mismanagement seem unclear.”**

Accountability is baked into the very DNA of this proposal. Extreme ownership means no excuses, no finger-pointing, and no room for mediocrity. As such, each SubDAO lead isn’t just accountable, they are responsible for the success or failure of their unit. If they fail, they are out. It is that simple. The Growth Program Leadership won’t hesitate to replace underperformers or reallocate resources.

You want safeguards? The entire structure is a safeguard. These are result driven leaders, operating with crystal clear KPIs and reporting structures that give the DAO full visibility into their performance. This isn’t about ‘shifting accountability’, it’s about ensuring ruthless accountability.

“Why do we need an 8-SubDAO structure? Other DAOs operate with leaner teams.”

Lean doesn’t always mean effective. Lean can mean underfunded, underprepared, and overwhelmed. What we are proposing isn’t bloated; it’s optimized for collaboration and specialization. Every SubDAO has a clear purpose, and together they form a powerhouse of growth driving synergy. You wouldn’t ask a single chef to run a Michelin star kitchen, would you? You’d assemble a team of specialists who bring out the best in each other.

Other DAOs may get by with “leaner” teams, but Compound isn’t “other DAOs.” Compound Community should demand an infrastructure capable of handling complexity at scale. You can’t outpace the competition by cutting corners. You outpace them by investing in the systems and people that deliver exponential results.

“Is $5M per $1B of TVL too much? This front-loads costs.”

Front loading? it’s an investment. For every $1B in TVL, Compound generates $10M annually. By paying out $5M upfront, the DAO gets a perpetual revenue stream. You’re not spending money, you’re buying a cash cow. Every dollar invested today generates continuous stream of revenue for years to come. That’s not cost, it’s compounding value.

The reason to spend $5M is that top-tier talent in DeFi doesn’t come cheap. The $5M is a finder’s fee for creating billions in sustainable value. A protocol is not a company any incremental reserves added is found money originally we thought it more appropriate in the 70-80% range however for this year 50% or 5Million seemed more appropriate. 20-30% makes sense when capital is at risk because it can be lost. For fee generation and protocol growth the cost is time and services. Would you pay 6 Million to have 10 million in your account in 12 months? I sure would.

Response 4: “Why allocate resources to security when OpenZeppelin already handles this?”

This isn’t about redundancy; it’s about resilience. OpenZeppelin handles protocol security, but what about the end to end security of partnerships, integrations, and new launches? Compound isn’t statistic, it’s evolving, and evolution demands proactive security measures. The dedicated security officer ensures that no stone is left unturned and no risk goes unchecked.

And let’s address the elephant in the room: $4M annually for OpenZeppelin. If we are already investing heavily in security, who is able to manage and determine whether or not they are delivering effectively. Why we aren’t shipping more upgrades is that it takes months to get any simple upgrade thru such as the rewards contract. Who currently is responsible to determin whether or not OpenZeppeling does a good job? While security is the bedrock of DeFi success. Over preparing beats under delivering every time. Especially when it is needed to keep up with growth.

Response 5: “KPIs aren’t defined upfront. How can the DAO evaluate success?”

KPIs aren’t vague, they’re evolving. This isn’t about deferring accountability; it’s about ensuring that the goals are realistic, relevant, and achievable. Defining KPIs in collaboration with SubDAO teams ensures alignment, buy-in, and precision. Ambitious goals set in isolation are just guesses. We are building KPIs that reflect the DAO’s real world needs and growth opportunities.

But let me flip the question: what’s the alternative? Setting arbitrary KPIs now and watching them crumble later? No thanks. This is about building measurable, actionable metrics that guarantee success, not setting the DAO up for failure with unrealistic expectations.

The Bigger Picture: Why This Proposal Wins

This isn’t just a proposal, it’s a blueprint for growth a blueprint of success. It’s not about throwing money at a problem; it’s about creating a high-performance machine that generates sustained value for Compound. Here’s why this works:

Extreme Ownership: Leaders who own their outcomes create results.

Specialized Teams: Collaboration isn’t overlap — it’s synergy.

Performance-Based Incentives: Aligning rewards with results ensures everyone is playing to win.

Visionary Investment: Every dollar spent today plants seeds for tomorrow’s wealth.

Think Bigger

If you’re sitting there looking for reasons to say no, let me ask you this: what’s your plan? Where’s the bold vision that propels Compound forward? Growth doesn’t come from playing it safe. It comes from making calculated bets, taking risks, and backing teams that know how to win.

This proposal is about turning Compound from a protocol into something inspiring and for something other DAOs aspire to be. We want to be part of growing winning protocol, not a vendor content being 4th place. The choice is yours, fortune favors the bold. And we can make history together.

[mexilc]

My account was suspended for stating a fact AlphaGrowth didnt like.

I stated: The ask here is 9200 COMP, which didnt change from your last proposal. [Verifiable fact]

My account was muted / suspended for saying that.

Bryan can typee all he wants but if accounts in the forum are suspended for disagreeing with AlphaGrowth, there isnt a true discussion going on, its a dictatorship. When did AlphaGrowth become the dictator of Compound?

While Im at it, I agree with gauntlet. Creating 8 SubDAOs to expand your team and having Compound pay for it is definitely somthing. Why does AlphaGrowth need 35 people to achieve its goal? Also, performance bonuses on top of a huge budget ask, WHAT.
Growing Compound is a part of your mandate, no? And you want a $5m bonus for bringing in TVL. How are we to know you arent gaming the TVL? Make a deal for it to last a year, get paid $5m. You pay the TVL $2.5m, you pocket the difference?

If AlphaGrowth is willing to silence me for a factual comment, what else are they doing behind the scenes? I will not be silenced so easily

I created a twitter account. Posted this reply, then DMed it compound delegates in case this gets deleted. Tagged a few people in my twitter thread as well

[cmrn]

@bryancolligan

Every dollar invested today generates infinite returns tomorrow.

With the utmost respect for AG’s contributions since being onboarded, I am unsure how a statement like this is supposed to be taken seriously.

[bryancolligan]

Decentralized governance thrives on open discourse, but forums have moderation policies to maintain constructive dialogue. Sir multiple times your posts were seen to be unhelpful, unconstructive and antagonistic. I was asked multiple times from multiple teams to ban you. We had a conversation about it you agreed to tone it down and provide constructive feedback.

“Why does AlphaGrowth need 35 people to achieve its goals? Isn’t this excessive?”

Think of each SubDAO as a micro-organization with specific expertise marketing, partnerships, security, contributing to the broader Compound ecosystem.

The alternative is to overload a leaner team, risking burnout, inefficiency, and missed opportunities. I do agree the DAO needs clear metrics which we don’t have. And we will continue to push discourse on what these metrics should be.

“Performance bonuses on top of a huge budget? Isn’t growing Compound already part of AlphaGrowth’s mandate?”

The key here is alignment. Bonuses are a mechanism to tie outcomes to incentives. AlphaGrowth’s mandate is to grow Compound, but incentivizing exceptional performance ensures results.

As for the $5M bonus per $1B TVL, consider this: the DAO only pays if there’s measurable success. It’s a finder’s fee based on realized outcomes, and every dollar Compound spends returns value through sustained TVL growth. Skepticism about “gaming TVL” is valid, and we are happy to chat on the mechanisms and criteria(30,60 day TVL avg) to address these concerns.

Rather than dismiss the bonus outright, let’s collaborate and refine the structure and incentives.

• Contractual Clauses: Ensure that performance bonuses are contingent on TVL retention over a defined period (30,60,90 days).
• Auditable Metrics: We have already put together Dune Dashboads with transparency.
• Execution: The DAO will need to Vote for the bonus after 12 months.

Happy to have constructive conversations that are solution focused and build systems in which the results speak for themselves.

[bryancolligan]

good feedback changed to “Every dollar invested today generates continuous stream of reserves for years to come”

[mexilc]

I literally stated I was talking about my latest suspension. But if you want to go there, fine.

I have tried to hold back the negative comments but you and your team continue to be antagonistic. Here we go:

Let’s be frank. You are asking for a wildly expanding budget from last year. You dont show tangible value to the Compound DAO outside of taking credit for TVL growth when the markets went up (not necessarily driven by AlphaGrowth TVL additions like you claim) AND you look like you are raiding the Compound Treasury by asking the DAO to hire 35 people, put them under AlphaGrowth with little accountability to the DAO.

@bryancolligan

“Why does AlphaGrowth need 35 people to achieve its goals? Isn’t this excessive?”

Think of each SubDAO as a micro-organization with specific expertise marketing, partnerships, security, contributing to the broader Compound ecosystem.

The alternative is to overload a leaner team, risking burnout, inefficiency, and missed opportunities. I do agree the DAO needs clear metrics which we don’t have. And we will continue to push discourse on what these metrics should be.

I dont think a budget request should be approved until metrics are clearly define, budget spend is outlined line by line explicitly, and we know how much of the budget is going to AlphaGrowth’s bottom line via margin.

Let’s go back to the forum post:

Accountability and Oversight
Your emphasis on “extreme ownership” is noted, but it does not answer the central question: who within AlphaGrowth is accountable to the DAO, and how will that accountability be enforced? If SubDAO leads underperform collectively or if the Growth Program itself falls short, what recourse does the DAO have to ensure corrective action? The lack of clarity on direct oversight remains a significant concern.

Organizational Structure
The proposed 8-SubDAO structure continues to feel unnecessarily complex, potentially duplicative, and we are being honest, exploitative. There is no clear explanation of why existing resources or fewer, more focused teams couldn’t achieve similar outcomes than growing to 8 SubDAOs.

Ok back to the latest reply:

@bryancolligan

As for the $5M bonus per $1B TVL, consider this: the DAO only pays if there’s measurable success. It’s a finder’s fee based on realized outcomes, and every dollar Compound spends returns value through sustained TVL growth. Skepticism about “gaming TVL” is valid, and we are happy to chat on the mechanisms and criteria(30,60 day TVL avg) to address these concerns.

Bryan, your mandate is to grow Compound. You are being paid to do so already. You are asking to GREATLY increase your budget to over $16m (from the last renewal thread) and you are still asking for a performance bonus? I dont get it? The argument that this bonus is equivalent to a finder’s fee ignores the fact that the DAO is already funding growth through this proposal yet you want more? How is that not exploitative?

[cmrn]

@mexilc

I dont think a budget request should be approved until metrics are clearly define, budget spend is outlined line by line explicitly, and we know how much of the budget is going to AlphaGrowth’s bottom line via margin.

This here is not asking so much. Cost-plus deals are similar and popular.

[bryancolligan]

To date 814MM has been explicitly added by AlphaGrowth’s Growth Program since May 25th.

This is over 33% of all existing TVL in compound v3.

You can see the all the transparent details here:
https://dune.com/dima_woof/alpagrowth-x-woof

Highly recommend going over other 2024 wins:

[AlphaGrowth] 2024: A Year in Review

Moving into the New Year, let’s take a look at how AlphaGrowth has served Compound in 2024, and what we can look forward to in 2025. [1] $814M in New TVL AlphaGrowth added $814 Million in new TVL through deployments onto New Chains, listing New Assets and running Incentive Campaigns. We see our time in 2024 as an initial exploration of what is possible for Compound Growth, and plan to dive more deeply into each component of growth in 2025. Dune Dashboard: https://dune.com/dima_woof/alpagrowth-…

In 6 months we completed and exceeded our mandate of $500MM. We exceeded our own expectations and we are looking to do more in 2025 with the support of the community.

[mexilc]

The rest of my point stand unanswered.

Glad to see TVL coming to Compound but I still want you to address the rest of the points.

[bryancolligan]

Please review this article:

[AlphaGrowth] A Proposed Payment Mechanism to Promote Participation in the Compound Community

The Growth Program recently put forward a 2025 re-election vote. One of the objections to the election was the manner in which the tokens would be paid. This is a response to that line of discourse and hopefully a structure that can help additional projects helping Compound as well. Feedback greatly appreciated. TL;DR Our goal is a proposed structure for the DAO to fund teams who put forward plans to improve Compound Protocol without requiring them to have spent years build credibility with th…

[mexilc]

I have reviewed the post several times. My points above still stand unanswered

[mexilc]

I cannot be the only one seeing the Snapshot voting options as a little ridiculous:

Voting Options

** Option 1: Align Incentives

1. Empower individuals to take responsibility for their contributions.
2. Hold team members accountable for outcomes.
3. Align incentives with the overall success of the organization.
   Expected Outcome: Strong leadership, clear objectives, and tangible progress.

** Option 2: Maintain the Status Quo

1. Continue with ambiguity.
2. No defined accountability for progress.
3. Hope for success without a concrete plan.
   Expected Outcome: Potential for stagnation and missed opportunities.

[bryancolligan]

Please Vote According to your View point.