MakerDAO’s recent flashloan voting event goes to show how governance mechanism design is very important. I wanted to start this thread to brainstorm some pros/cons and potential corner cases for various changes to the governance system.
I find this to be an interesting argument. In the existing process, the proposers have “insider” information. They can accrue additional votes before proposing. Why should proposers be the only ones privy to this? Extending the proposal delay evens the playing field to an extent for everyone else.
Just playing devils advocate, but an interesting outlook.
Maybe the COMP token should be split out into a voting component/token and an economic interest component/token. The latter would be for any future distributions or drops and reflect economic interest in the protocol (sort of like nonvoting shares); it could be used as the main collateral component for now. Both could trade independently. Might help avoid some of these issues with borrowing COMP to influence votes.